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I. INTRODUCTION 
Europe has witnessed an intensive debate on collective redress over the 
course of the last decade. Unlike in the United States and other common law 
oriented countries, class actions and settlements do not yet have a firm grounding 
in most European jurisdictions. However, the tide is changing with more than 
half of all EU Member States now having established some sort of compensatory 
collective redress procedure.1 The European Union has undertaken several 
initiatives to regulate collective redress. Current E.U. legislation falls short when 
enforcing substantive E.U. law, particularly consumer law and competition law. 
At the same time, the great variation between the domestic systems of the 
Member States may disturb the desired level playing-field and thus hamper 
cross-border litigation. Discussions in the European Union are characterized by 
opposing views in the Member States and fear for abusive litigation.2 In June 
2013, the European Commission released its long-awaited policy in the form of a 
non-binding Recommendation, setting out common principles for collective 
redress.3 Establishing a genuine pan-European procedure on collective redress 
appeared unfeasible. Nevertheless, this Recommendation marks an important 
step for the future of E.U. collective redress. 
In the ongoing European debate, the Dutch procedure on the basis of the 
Dutch Collective Settlements Act (Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade, 
abbreviated as “WCAM”) plays an important role.4 The WCAM entered into 
 
1. See, e.g., Stefaan Voet, European Collective Redress Developments, SSRN (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318809 (describing collective redress developments on the 
European level and within the jurisdictions of the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Belgium).  
2. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress, at 3, COM (2013) 401/2 final (Nov. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Communication 
from the Commission]. 
3. Id. at 4; Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted 
Under Union Law, at 5, COM (2013) 3539/3 final (June 11, 2013).  
4. The Dutch government has provided an English summary of the Act and its features. See generally The 
Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), RIJKSOVERHEID (June 24, 2008), http://www. 
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-class-action-financial-settlement-
act-wcam.html. 
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force in 2005,5 and since that time has attracted several influential transnational 
cases.6 These include the Shell7 and Converium8 securities cases, in which Dutch 
settlements were reached, partially complementary to actions and settlements in 
the United States. Recently, The Economist mentioned the Netherlands as a 
favourable venue for class settlements in an article on class actions in Europe.9 
Furthermore, a quality Dutch Financial Newspaper addressed the issue of the 
Netherlands ‘hoping to take over U.S. business’ when the Converium interim 
decision was rendered in 2010.10 The rise of the Dutch settlement is in part a 
result of the landmark case of Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court limited securities class actions to U.S. litigants or shares 
bought on the U.S. stock exchange.11 
The transnational expansion of the Dutch WCAM procedure is, however, not 
without its problems. Its distinct features, notably the ‘settlement without action’ 
and the opt-out mechanism coupled with the wide jurisdictional reach, have 
raised criticism in Europe and beyond.12 It is also questionable if the exclusive 
settlement system and opt-out feature are in compliance with the European 
Commission’s Recommendation. This makes the wide jurisdiction as adopted by 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal all the more problematic. Additionally, existing 
rules on international jurisdiction, particularly those of the Brussels I 
Regulation,13 are not well-suited to accommodate the specific design of the Dutch 
WCAM. This also raises a second issue, namely whether the court decision to 
declare the settlement binding will be recognized and declared enforceable both 
inside and outside the European Union. Naturally, businesses willing to settle 
 
5. Id. at 1. 
6. See Xandra E. Kramer, Enforcing Mass Settlements in the European Judicial Area: EU Policy and the 
Strange Case of Dutch Collective Settlements (WCAM), in RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND 
SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 63, 78 (Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler eds., 2013) (addressing a table 
listing these cases). 
7. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI5744] 
(Shell Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank NV Netherlands) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum NV]. 
8. Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908] 
(Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Converium]. 
9. Chasseurs d’ambulances: Class-Action Suits are Coming to Europe, ECONOMIST (Paris) (May 11, 2013) 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21577426-class-action-suits-are-coming-europe-chasseurs-dambulances. 
10. Anne de Groot, Nederland Hoopt Stokje VS Over te Nemen als Land van Class Actions, HET 
FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD (Nov. 17, 2010) (The Netherlands hopes to take over from the US as the country of 
class actions). 
11. Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd.,130 S. Ct 2869, 2883 (2010); see Linda J. Silberman, 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global Securities Class Actions, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 363 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012); see Ahold 
Decisions, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2011; see Wulf A. Kaal 
& Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. REV. 132, 165-85 (2012).  
12. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 11, 14. 
13. As of January 10, 2015, a new Regulation as a result of the recast of the current Regulation will be 
applicable. European Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, art. 66, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU). 
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aim for the preclusive effect of such settlements. Similar doubts have been 
expressed in relation to the recognition and enforcement of the United States opt-
out class action and class settlement.14 A third question relates to the applicable 
law in those transnational cases, although this issue has triggered less debate, and 
is not regarded as problematic in Dutch practice. Traditional choice of law rules 
in the European Union, notably the Rome I Regulation (with reference to 
contractual disputes) and the Rome II Regulation (with respect to non-contractual 
actions), are not well adapted to claims related to mass harm.15 
This article explores the issues of international jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement and the applicable law in relation to transnational WCAM 
settlements, particularly in securities cases. It questions whether these matters are 
adequately addressed in Dutch practice, against the background of the existing 
(E.U.) legislation, and whether the current legislative framework is able to 
facilitate class actions and settlements. Part II discusses the WCAM against the 
background of its use in transnational cases and E.U. policy initiatives.16 The 
article will not address the general features and practice of this procedure in 
detail, since these are discussed in other contributions in this journal and 
elsewhere.17 Part III will focus on the international jurisdiction of the Dutch 
courts to declare a collective settlement under the WCAM binding.18 Part IV will 
elaborate on the recognition and enforcement of collective settlements in the E.U. 
Member States and in other countries.19 In Part V several questions regarding the 
applicable law to collective settlements will be discussed.20 Part VI will draw 
some conclusions on the use of the Dutch WCAM in transnational securities 
 
14. See generally Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in 
European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31 (2008); see generally Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in 
England and Wales of United States Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433 (2011); see generally 
Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment in 
England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MODERN L. REV. 180 (2012); see generally Stefania Bariatti, Recognition 
and Enforcement in the EU of Judicial Decisions Rendered Upon Class Actions: The Case of U.S. and Dutch 
Judgments and Settlements, in RECASTING BRUSSELS I 319 (Fausto Pocar et al. eds., 2012); see generally 
Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 893 (2012). 
15. European Parliament and Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 6 (EC) [hereinafter 
Rome I]; European Parliament and Council Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 42 (EC) [hereinafter 
Rome II]. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See generally Willem H. Van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands, in AUF 
DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE 171 (Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009); see generally 
Tomas Arons & Willem H. Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim 
Settlements from The Netherlands, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857 (2010); see generally Ianika Tzankova & Hélène 
van Lith, Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: An Update from the Netherlands, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 67 (2012). See also The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial 
Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
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cases while considering the background of the European Commission’s 
Recommendation.21 
II. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS IN A GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
A. Dutch WCAM Settlements: National Icon with Global Aspirations 
Intended to operate as an addition to the possibility for foundations and 
associations to file for injunctive relief on behalf of interested persons in order to 
protect their rights,22 the Dutch legislature passed the WCAM in 2005.23 This Act 
was originally not intended to handle transnational securities cases.24 Its 
introduction was triggered by a pharmaceutical product liability case, the DES 
affair, which only involved Dutch litigants.25 In this case, the Dutch Supreme 
Court had already established liability.26 The industry involved was keen to reach 
a damages settlement, but a proper legal mechanism for collective settlement was 
absent.27 The WCAM was established to fill this gap.28 The Act consists of four 
provisions in the Dutch Civil Code dealing with the settlement as such,29 and six 
provisions in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure concerning the court procedure 
at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (which is exclusively competent in these 
matters).30 
The Dutch mass settlement regime is rather unique in Europe. Outside 
Europe—and especially in the United States, Australia and Canada—mass 
settlements also play an important role, since many class actions are ultimately 
settled. However, as opposed to these systems, the Netherlands does not have a 
collective action for the compensation of damages; it relies solely on settlements. 
Representative association(s) or foundation(s) conclude, on behalf of the victims 
(designated as “interested parties” or “beneficiaries”), a settlement agreement 
with the allegedly responsible party.31 Upon joint request, the Amsterdam Court 
 
21. See infra Part VI. 
22. See BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] art. 3:305a (Neth.). This provision does not enable claims for 
compensatory relief. 
23. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4. 
24. See generally Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006: 
AAX6440] (Bayer AG/Ace European Group Ltd.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Bayer AG]. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 2.3. 
27. Id. at 3.1. 
28. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4.  
29. BW art. 7:907-10 (Neth.).  
30. See WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [RV] art. 1013-18a (Neth.). 
31. BW art. 7:907 (Neth.). It provides that “[a]n agreement for the purpose of compensating damage 
caused by an event or similar events, concluded between a foundation or association with full legal capacity and 
one or more other parties who have engaged themselves under this agreement to pay compensation for this 
damage may, upon the joint request of the parties, . . . be declared binding by the court for other persons to 
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of Appeal declares the settlement binding.32 Unlike, for example, in the U.S. class 
action and settlement system, no ‘class member’ represents a group.33 If the 
interested parties do not wish to be bound, they should make use of the opt-out 
possibility.34 To safeguard fairness of the settlement, the law imposes rules on the 
representativeness of the foundation or association as well as a reasonableness 
test as to the amount of damages.35 In practice, the Amsterdam Court plays a very 
active role in the whole process, including the service (notification) of (foreign) 
interested parties.36 
As mentioned, the Dutch system is based solely on a settlement, as collective 
action for compensation is not yet available. In creating the WCAM mechanism, 
the Dutch legislature clarified that it was inspired by the U.S. class action and 
particularly the practical experience.37 It deliberately chose to omit the action 
part, for which it provided the following reasoning: 
The WCAM opts for a collective settlement in order to avoid the 
complications that arise fairly often in American damages class actions. 
These happen because many of the issues connected with a compensation 
claim can only be answered individually. They might include, for 
example, issues of causality, contributory negligence and especially the 
extent of the damage. Once the legal issues in common have been dealt 
with, all of the individual victims then have to get involved in the 
proceedings so as to obtain answers to the issues affecting them 
individually. The result is that completion of a class action is quite often 
extremely complex and time-consuming.38 
To date, six settlements have been declared binding under the WCAM.39 A 
seventh request for a binding declaration has been filed in the insolvency case 
involving the DSB bank to compensate its former customers in May 2013.40 
 
whom the damage was caused, provided that the foundation or association represents the interests of these 
persons pursuant to its articles of association (articles of incorporation).” Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.). 
35. BW art. 7:907(3)(e)-(f) (Neth.). 
36. See, e.g., Hof’s-Amsterdam 23 april 2013 [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:BZ8345] (Appellant/Varde 
Investments Ltd.) (Neth.) at 4 [hereinafter Varde Investments Ltd.]. 
37. The Dutch ‘Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act’ (‘WCAM’), supra note 4. 
38. Id. 
39. Bayer AG, supra note 24; Varde Investments Ltd., supra note 36; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009, 
NJF 2009, 247 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2717] (Stichting Vie D’Or) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie D’Or]; 
Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. A.C.W. 
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BJ2691] (Randstad Holding N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior]; Converium, supra 
note 8; Kramer, supra note 6, at 78 (addressing a table listing these cases). 
40. See Administrators of DSB Bank N.V., Insolvency Report No. 18 (2013), available at http://www. 
dsbbank.nl/crediteuren/en/public-reports/dsb-bank-%28public-reports%29/ (addressing the Eighteenth Public 
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Dutch practitioners generally regard it as a satisfactory system. In 2013, several 
amendments to the Act have been introduced to regulate collective redress in 
insolvency cases and to strengthen certain requirements, inter alia those 
regarding the representativeness, procedural fairness, and the service of foreign 
defendants.41 
Although the WCAM was not established with a view to transnational 
commercial cases, it has attracted international attention.42 While the first three 
settlement cases involved few cross-border elements, the Shell, Vedior, and 
Converium settlements involved many foreign interested parties.43 The 
Converium case not only involved primarily non-Dutch residents as interested 
parties, but also a responsible party with a corporate seat in Switzerland and 
concerned misleading information regarding stocks sold on the Swiss stock 
exchange.44 The apparent globalization of the WCAM settlements has 
undoubtedly been boosted by the Morrison ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
closing the door on non-US residents buying stocks on a foreign stock exchange 
(‘foreign cubed actions’).45 The Shell and Converium settlements were in part 
complementary to US settlements, and were confined to non-U.S. residents.46 
B. E.U. Policy on Collective Redress and Dutch WCAM Settlements 
The E.U. has been particularly active in the area of collective redress.47 This 
has been triggered by problems encountered in the enforcement of consumer law 
and competition law, and in the increasing importance of collective redress under 
the national laws of the Member States and in practice. The E.U. debate is 
marked by strong lobbies pro and contra collective redress and opposite views on 
the appropriate model, against the background of a great variety of domestic 
systems in the Member States and the fear for abusive litigation.48 
  
 
Report on the DSB Bank in English). 
41. See Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Amendments to the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure 
and the Bankruptcy Act to Facilitate the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Further (Law Amending the Law 
Collective Settlement), OVERHEID.NL (June 13, 2013), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33126-
C.html. 
42. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Vedior, supra note 39; Converium, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
43. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Vedior, supra note 39, at 2.8; Converium, 
supra note 8, at 1-2. 
44. Converium, supra note 8, at 2. 
45. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 165. 
46. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 3.2; Converium, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
47. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 15-41 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein, eds., 1st ed. 2012) 
for an overview of the initiatives and developments. 
48. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 3. 
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1. Sectorial Approaches and the Horizontal Recommendation on Collective 
Redress 
Initially, the European debate focused on sectorial approaches in the area of 
competition law and consumer law.49 The Directorate General Competition (“DG 
COMP”) commissioned a study on the issue of damages and redress.50 This 2004 
study concluded that the award of private damages for the violation of E.U. 
competition law were underdeveloped.51 In 2005, a Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of E.U. Anti-Trust Rules was published,52 followed by a 
White Paper in 2008, containing specific proposals to overcome the hurdles in 
private enforcement of competition law.53 It promoted a combination of collective 
redress brought by representative organizations, such as consumer or trade 
associations, and collective actions brought by individuals based upon an opt-in 
model.54 
At the same time, the Directorate General on Health and Consumers (“DG 
SANCO”) was working on collective redress for the protection of consumers. 
The current legislative framework already provides for limited collective action 
in the area of consumer law pursuant of Directive 98/27/EC on Consumer 
Injunctions.55 However, the Directive only deals with representative injunctive 
relief and does not provide for skimming off profits as a result of a violation of 
consumer rules or compensatory relief for consumers.56 Several studies have 
shown that consumers have relatively little opportunity to make use of the 
existing mechanisms, and that financing is one of the main concerns.57 In 2008, a 
Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress was published presenting various 
options ranging from no additional action to enacting a European collective 
redress procedure.58 After a follow-up consultation paper published in 2009, as 
 
49. The competence for E.U. initiatives in these areas are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union arts. 101, 102, 169, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 49 [hereinafter TEFU]. The general 
competence for measures to harmonize the law is laid down in TFEU article 114. 
50. See generally DENIS WAELBROECK, ET AL., STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN 
CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES: COMPARATIVE REPORT 3 (Aug. 31, 2014), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf. 
51. Id. (provinding an overview of activities). The debate was triggered by a CJEU ruling stating that 
victims of a breach of E.U. competition rules have a right to damages. Case C-453/89, Courage v. Crehan, 2001 
E.C.R. I-6297 at 78. 
52. See generally Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 
COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005). 
53. See generally Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 
COM (2008) 165 final (April 2, 2008).  
54. Id. at 4.  
55. Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51, 52 (EC). 
56. Id.  
57. Health and Consumers, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm (last 
updated Apr. 12, 2013).  
58. Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, at 7-14, COM (2008) 794 final (Nov. 27, 2008).  
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well as various hearings and informal meetings, concrete initiatives were 
suspended.59 
In 2010, the Directorate Generals COMP and SANCO joined forces and 
were accompanied by DG Justice, since it was acknowledged that collective 
redress not only is about enforcing substantive law, but also has important 
implications for civil justice.60 In 2011, a public consultation paper was published 
on a ‘Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,’ providing important 
input to the European debate.61 This is also evidenced by the fact that this 
Consultation paper received over 19,000 responses from Governments, 
associations, and other stakeholders, as well as from individuals.62 Three of the 
questions put forward in this paper concerned the cross-border application of 
collective redress.63 In particular, the possible need for rules on international 
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement was addressed.64 These two 
issues have raised concern in the cross-border application of the Dutch WCAM 
procedure.65 
In a Resolution adopted on its own initiative in January 2012, the European 
Parliament showed for the first time a certain willingness to establish European 
rules on collective redress.66 The Resolution stated that this action should take the 
form of a horizontal instrument, covering all areas of E.U. law.67 The Parliament 
pointed out that Europe must refrain from introducing a U.S.-style class action or 
any system that does not respect European legal traditions.68 It even referred to 
the U.S. class action system, including third-party funding and punitive damages 
as supporting ‘frivolous litigation.’69 The Resolution underlines the need for 
stringent safeguards to avoid abuse.70 These concern inter alia standing, the opt-
 
59. Consultation Paper for Discussion on the Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress (May 29, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper 
2009.pdf. 
60. The cooperation between these DGs had also been instructed by President Barrosso in 2010. See A 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps, Joint Information Note by Vice-President 
Viviane Reding, Vice-President Joaquín Almunia and Commissioner John Dalli , in Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress, at 3, SEC (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010).  
61. See generally Commission Staff Working Document on Public Consultation, in Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
62. For a summary of the outcomes, see Burkhard Hess, et al., Evaluation of Contributions to the Public 
Consultation and Hearing: “Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress” (Study JUST/2010// 
JCIV/CT/OO27/A4) at 4, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/ 
study_heidelberg_summary_en.pdf. 
63. Specifically, questions 14, 29, and 31. Id. at 9, 13. 
64. Id. at 6-7, 13. 
65. See infra Parts III, IV.  
66. European Parliament Resolution 2011/2089 (INI) at no. 4; see also the Motion for a European 
Parliament Resolution, (2011/2089(INI)). 
67. European Parliament Resolution 2011/2089 (INI) at no. 1. 
68. Id. at no. 2. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. at no. 20. 
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in model as the only acceptable model, the loser-pays principle, and a ban on 
third-party funding.71 It further considered that an ADR system should be backed 
up by an effective judicial redress system, in order to give incentive to parties to 
settle.72 
In June 2013, the European Commission released its Communication 
Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States.73 This is accompanied by a 
Communication entitled ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for 
Collective Redress,’ outlining background and policy pickets.74 Additionally, the 
Commission adopted a proposal for actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of E.U. competition law.75 However, this proposed directive does 
not oblige Member States to put collective redress mechanisms in place to 
enforce competition law.76 The Recommendation aims “to facilitate access to 
justice, stop illegal practices and enable injured parties to obtain 
compensation . . . while ensuring appropriate procedural safeguards to avoid 
abusive litigation.”77 For this purpose, it recommends that all Member States have 
collective redress mechanisms in place “for both injunctive and compensatory 
relief, which respect the basic principles set out in this Recommendation.”78 
These principles respect the different legal traditions of the Member States, 
however, they should ensure that the procedures are fair, equitable, timely and 
not prohibitively expensive. The explicit mention of the different legal traditions 
points to the difficult discussions that took place in view of the diverging national 
systems and the objections of some Member States against E.U. intervention.79 
 
71. Id.  
72. Id. at no. 25. 
73. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 5.  
74. See generally id.  
75. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Rules Governing 
Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union, at 2, COM (2013) 404 final (June 11, 2013). 
76. Id. at 23.  
77. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 5. 
78. Id. 
79. The Recommendation defines “collective redress” as: “(i) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility 
to claim cessation of illegal behaviour collectively by two or more natural or legal persons or by an entity 
entitled to bring a representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal mechanism that ensures a 
possibility to claim compensation collectively by two or more natural or legal persons claiming to have been 
harmed in a mass harm situation or by an entity entitled to bring a representative action (compensatory 
collective redress).” A “mass harm situation” is very extensively defined as “a situation where two or more 
natural or legal persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage resulting from the same illegal activity of 
one or more natural or legal persons.” Id.  
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The common principles relate to the standing to bring a representative action, 
admissibility of actions, information on a collective redress action, and the loser 
pays principle, as well as funding.80 The Dutch collective settlement system by 
and large complies with these specific requirements.81 As a result of the recent 
amendment of the WCAM, the rules on the representation have become stricter 
to secure representativeness.82 The reimbursement of legal costs and (third party) 
funding is not an issue, since the responsible party (i.e., business) wishing to 
settle bears all the costs.83 More important for the present purposes, the 
Recommendation states that “[t]he claimant party should be formed on the basis 
of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed 
(‘opt-in’ principle).”84 ADR and settlements are presented as an addition to 
judicial procedures.85 The possible implications of these principles, as well as 
cross-border aspects will be elaborated in the following sub-section. 
2. Possible Implications for the Dutch WCAM and Cross-Border Litigation 
The Recommendation is a set of non-binding common principles.86 It is 
unusual for the Commission to choose this particular type of instrument, but for 
the moment it is the only compromise that was feasible on this matter. A 
proposal for a binding regulation or directive would have needed the approval of 
the Council and the European Parliament, and it would have been unlikely that 
the required majority of Member States would approve a harmonised system of 
European collective redress.87 However, the Recommendation is not merely a 
shot in the dark. “The Member States should implement the principles set out in 
this Recommendation in national collective redress systems by [26 July 2015] at 
the latest.”88 It further obliges Member States to collect reliable annual statistics 
 
80. Id. at 4-17. 
81. But see supra Part II.B.ii. 
82. See supra Part II.A. 
83. See supra Part II.A. 
84. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 21.  
85. Id. at 25-28. 
86. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Rules Governing 
Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union, supra note 75.  
87. Such uniform procedures have in recent years been established for orders for payment, European 
Order for Payment Procedure, 2006 O.J. (L 399) at 1, and small claims, European Small Claims Procedure, 
2007 O.J. (L 199) at 1; while a proposal for a European account preservation order is pending. Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Creating a European Account Preservation Order to 
Facilitate Cross-Border Debt Recovery in Civil & Commercial Matters, at 1, COM (2011) 445 final (July 25, 
2011). 
88. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
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on judicial and out-of-court collective redress.89 Furthermore, it is to be expected 
that the Commission will have a stringent follow-up and that this 
Recommendation is only a first step in the further harmonization.90 Additionally, 
the Recommendation may have a more indirect effect, particularly on the 
recognition of Dutch settlements in other Member States.91 
The Dutch WCAM scheme is, however, not in compliance with the common 
principles of the Recommendation in all respects. The first important issue is that 
the Recommendation requires a collective action system.92 Settlements are only 
encouraged to settle the dispute and to be verified by a court taking into 
consideration the interests and rights of all parties involved.93 As discussed 
earlier, the Netherlands deliberately chose not to put a collection action for the 
compensation of damage in place when the WCAM was enacted.94 However, in 
2011 a motion was filed to extend the current scheme for collective injunctive 
relief filed by representative organisations, pursuant to Article 3:305a BW to 
compensation for victims.95 To date, this initiative has not yet resulted in more 
concrete steps. In its response to the Recommendation of the Commission, the 
Dutch Government does not respond to this issue. Generally, the Dutch 
government expresses its doubts on whether the Recommendation fulfils the E.U. 
law requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.96 The Netherlands does not 
seem to have the immediate intention to establish a collective action to accord 
with the Recommendation. 
The second possible incompatibility is that the Recommendation is clearly 
based on an opt-in principle, though it does not fully shut the door on opt-out 
mechanisms.97 The abovementioned Recommendation No. 21 adds that any 
exception to the opt-in principles, by law or by court order, “should be duly 
justified by reasons of sound administration of justice.”98 In its response to the 
Recommendation, the Dutch Ministry stated that the Netherlands assumes that 
 
Law, supra note 3, at 10. 
89. Id. 
90. This is a policy tactic that has also been pursued in the area of ADR, where in the 1990’s 
Recommendations were released and that has eventually resulted in several binding instruments. 
91. See infra Part IV.  
92. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 7. 
93. Id. at 8. 
94. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
95. The so-called ‘motie Dijksma’, see Tweede Kamer der Generaal, Vergaderjaar, 33000-XIII, no. 14 at 
2 (2011-12), available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33000-XIII-14.html. 
96. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, 22 113, no. 1663, Fiche ‘Mededeling en 
Aanbeveling Europees Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, no. 4, at 3 (2012-13) (stating that European 
initiatives have added value as far as they concern cross-border cases and that as far as the type of procedures 
and the structure of procedures are concerned Member States should be able to employ their own initiatives). 
97. See generally Communication from the Commission, supra note 2.  
98. Id. at 11. 
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the exclusivity of the opt-in principle does not apply to collective settlements.99 It 
continues that in case the European Commission also intends to extend its 
application to settlements, the Netherlands has serious questions.100 It argues that 
the associated risk of abuse does not extend to the Dutch settlement system; opt-
out is effective for settlements and the WCAM system works satisfactorily for 
the settling parties.101 Though these may be good arguments, it will likely not 
eliminate the European criticism of the Dutch WCAM. 
In regards to the cross-border aspects, the Recommendation provides little 
guidance.102 Recommendation No. 17 provides that Member States should ensure 
that where a dispute concerns parties from different Member States, a single 
collective action in a single forum is not prevented by national rules on 
admissibility or standing of foreign groups of claimants or representative 
entities.103 The Dutch WCAM mechanism clearly involves foreign victims and 
the law does not prohibit foreign representatives.104 According to 
Recommendation No. 18, any representative entity that has been officially 
designated in advance by a Member State to have standing should be permitted to 
seize the court in the Member State having jurisdiction.105 This provision should 
ensure the recognition and legal standing of representative entities in other 
Member States.106 
The Recommendation does not touch at all upon the questions of 
international jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement or the applicable 
law.107 In the accompanying Communication, the Commission remarks that many 
stakeholders have in fact asked for jurisdictional rules.108 However, views differ 
as to the content of such rules.109 The Commission considers that the rules of the 
 
99. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, ‘Mededeling en Aanbeveling Europees 
Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, supra note 96, at 4.  
100. See generally Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted 
Under Union Law, supra note 3.  
101. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 11. 
102. See generally Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar, ‘Mededeling en Aanbeveling 
Europees Horizontaal Kader Voor Collectief Verhaal’, supra note 96. 
103. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 7.  
104. See generally HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_ 
redress/saw_annex_en.pdf. 
105. Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union 
Law, supra note 3, at 7. 
106. See id. 
107. See generally id. 
108. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13. 
109. See supra Part II.B.ii.  
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Brussels I Regulation should be “fully exploited.”110 In view of the jurisdictional 
problems, as will be elaborated in the next section, this lack of further guidance is 
to be regretted.111 As to issues of recognition and enforcement, the Commission 
remarks that a future report on the application of the Brussels I Regulation should 
include information on the effective enforcement of cross-border collective 
redress actions.112 However, the subsequent report on the recently amended 
Brussels I Regulation is only to be expected by 2022.113 In relation to applicable 
law, the Commission states that it is not persuaded that special conflict of law 
rules are required to avoid the application of multiple laws.114 This means that the 
existing European private international law rules will continue to govern cross-
border collective settlements under the Dutch WCAM. In that regard the 
Recommendation is a missed opportunity 
III. DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 
This section focuses on the question whether the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
has international jurisdiction to assess the settlement and to declare it binding for 
it to have preclusive effect. International jurisdiction in Dutch and E.U. law 
should be distinguished from subject-matter jurisdiction under U.S. law,115 as was 
at stake in the landmark case of Morrison v. National Australian Bank, where it 
was ruled that the Securities Exchange Act did not extend to investors residing 
outside the United States that purchased from a non-U.S. defendant on a foreign 
securities exchange.116 From a European perspective this would be viewed as the 
scope of the domestic law, or an issue of choice of law. However, the result of 
not having international jurisdiction and not having subject-matter jurisdiction is 
in essence the same: those (foreign) parties are not welcome in court. It must be 
noted that the limited application of Dutch laws on financial services, for 
example the Act of Financial Supervision (Wet Financieel Toezicht) to financial 
institutions in the Netherlands, is not considered in the context of international 
jurisdiction or the admissibility of claims relating to private damages or 
compensation in a civil law suit.117 
  
 
110. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13. 
111. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
112. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, 13-14. 
113. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 79. 
114. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14. 
115. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
116. See id. 
117. See WET FINANCIEEL TOEZICHT [WFT] (Act of Financial Supervision), §§ 1:2, 1:6. 
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A. The Applicable Rules and the Jurisdictional Problem 
In the Netherlands, three jurisdictional systems are relevant for commercial 
cases and have been applied in WCAM cases. The primary system is that of the 
Brussels I Regulation.118 Resulting from a recast, as of January 10, 2012, this 
Regulation will be replaced by an amended version, referred to as the Brussels I-
bis Regulation.119 This Regulation will not bring about important changes in 
relation to the jurisdiction rules relevant for securities collective redress.120 The 
Brussels I Regulation applies generally in civil and commercial matters, in the 
situation where the defendant is domiciled in an E.U. Member State, or where the 
courts of an E.U. Member States have been chosen by way of a forum selection 
clause.121 The concept of domicile is in relation to legal persons widely defined in 
Article 60 Brussels I, and is either the place of the statutory seat (in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland the registered seat), or the central administration, or the 
principal place of business.122 For natural persons Article 59 refers to the national 
law of the Member States.123 In particular cases, the parallel Lugano Convention 
applies, notably where defendants from Iceland, Norway or Switzerland are 
involved or where the courts of these countries have been chosen.124 Hereafter, 
where reference to the Brussels I Regulation is made, the same will apply to the 
Lugano Convention. 
Where neither the Brussels I Regulation nor the Lugano Convention applies, 
domestic international jurisdiction rules apply. The Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure includes rules in Articles 1-14 that are largely based on the Brussels I 
system, though the domestic rules are generally less strict than the distributive 
E.U. rules.125 A feature of the Dutch domestic rules relevant in the context of 
WCAM settlements is that it includes a specific rule for cases introduced by way 
of a petition, as opposed to cases that are brought to court by way of a writ of 
summons.126 Petition cases under Dutch law are certain family cases, as well as 
specific requests in relation to inter alia corporations. Also the request to declare 
a WCAM settlement binding is a petition procedure, which means that Article 3 
of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure applies.127 Contrary to the defendant-
 
118. Kramer, supra note 6, at 63-90.  
119. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13. 
120. Kramer, supra note 6, at 63-90. 
121. See Council Regulation 44/2001, arts. 1-2, 4, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. 
122. See generally id. at art. 60. 
123. See generally id. at art. 59. 
124. See generally Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13. 
125. See generally Rv arts. 1-14 (Neth.). 
126. Id. at art. 3. 
127. Id. (“Where legal proceedings are to be initiated by a petition of the petitioner or his solicitor and it 
concerns other legal proceedings then those meant in Article 4 and 5, Dutch courts have jurisdiction:  
a. if either the petitioner or, where there are more petitioners, one of them, or one of the interested 
parties mentioned in the petition has his domicile or habitual residence in the Netherlands; 
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orientated Brussels I and Lugano rules, this Dutch provision provides for the 
Dutch court if the petitioner is domiciled or has his habitual residence in the 
Netherlands.128 
The application of the jurisdictional rules under these systems and 
particularly the European rules poses challenges. These rules are designed in 
view of typical litigation where one claimant and one defendant are involved and 
are not tailored to collective cross-border litigation.129 The specific Dutch WCAM 
scheme makes the application of the existing jurisdictional rules even more 
complicated. In a classical collective action, the group of victims is to be 
regarded as the plaintiff whereas the responsible business is the defendant. 
However, in the situation of the WCAM an out-of-court settlement is reached 
between the responsible business and the representative organization(s) and/or 
association(s) on behalf of the interested parties (injured parties).130 The question 
is on which basis the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has international jurisdiction to 
declare the settlement binding in the defendant-oriented European jurisdictional 
scheme. 
B. The Brussels Scheme: Relevant Jurisdiction Rules for Securities Litigation 
The general rule of the Brussels I Regulation is that the court of the Member 
State where the defendant is domiciled has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 11.131 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has repeatedly emphasized 
the primacy of this rule, making the other rules the exception.132 This provision 
allows for the bundling of claims against a single defendant in a classical class 
action setting.133 It does not require any further connection to this forum and thus 
also applies where a tort or contractual breach occurred in another country or 
where (all) plaintiffs reside in another country.134 The CJEU outlawed the forum 
non conveniens exception under the Brussels I Regulation and specifically 
Article 2, even where the competing forum is a non-E.U. country.135 In relation to 
the Dutch WCAM, the question is which party is to be regarded as the defendant. 
 
b. if the petition relates to proceedings which are or have to be initiated by a writ of summons and 
which fall under the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts; 
c. if the legal proceedings are otherwise sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere.”) 
128. Id. 
129. Horatia Muir Watt, Brussels I and Aggregate Litigation or the Case for Redesigning the Common 
Judicial Area in Order to Respond to Changing Dynamics, Functions and Structures in Contemporary 
Adjudication and Litigation, 30 IPRAX, at 112 (2010). 
130. See generally Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 133, 165-85. 
131. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 11. 
132. See generally Case C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and 
Co., 1988 E.C.R. 5565. 
133. See id. 
134. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 4-5. 
135. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2002 E.C.R. I-1383. 
04_KRAMER_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:51 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
251 
In the following sub-section, it will be discussed that the Dutch Court has held 
that the interested parties should be regarded as defendants, and thus Article 2 
applies.136 It is submitted that this approach is highly questionable.137 
Moreover, Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation provides an alternative 
jurisdiction rule regarding multiple defendants.138 It only applies where “the 
claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings.”139 The CJEU has construed this ground of jurisdiction narrowly 
since it deprives (other) defendants from litigating in their home forum.140 This 
provision is not to be applied to the situation where multiple plaintiffs are 
involved.141 However, since the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has held that the 
interested parties are to be regarded as defendants, Article 6(1) may be of use in 
the WCAM procedure.142 This provision does not extend to all cases. It does not 
apply to cases where protective jurisdiction rules apply, namely consumer 
contracts, insurance contracts and employment contracts.143 These protective rules 
will, however, generally be of little relevance in securities litigation. If in a case, 
the investor is to be qualified as a consumer within the meaning of Article 15 
Brussels I, this would result in (exclusive) jurisdiction of the court where the 
consumer has his habitual residence.144 
Alternative jurisdictional rules relating to the subject matter of the case are 
provided in Article 5 Brussels I Regulation.145 Article 5(1) relates to contractual 
obligations and provides jurisdiction for the court where the contract is to be 
performed. Article 5(3) is concerned with tortious claims and refers to the court 
of the place where the harmful event occurred.146 Generally, it may be expected 
that the tort provision will have the most potential for the basis for jurisdiction in 
collective redress cases, and would to a certain extent enable parties to 
concentrate the case in one single forum.147 This is particularly so since the CJEU 
has interpreted this rule in its famous Rhinewater case as giving the claimant a 
choice between the place where the harmful event giving rise to the damage 
 
136. See infra Part III.C.i. 
137. See infra Part III.C.i. 
138. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 4-5. 
139. Id. 
140. See Case C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co., 1988 
E.C.R. 5565 (a landmark case). 
141. See Eva Lein, Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction under Brussels I, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 129, 138 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).  
142. Id. at 139. 
143. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 5-7. 
144. Id. at 7. 
145. Id. at 4. 
146. Id. 
147. See id.  
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occurred and the place where the damage was sustained.148 However, as will be 
discussed more extensively in the following sub-section, in Dutch practice, it is 
the contract-jurisdiction included in Article 5(1) that has been used to vest 
jurisdiction.149 
The last head of jurisdiction to be considered is the choice of forum as laid 
down in Article 23 Brussels I Regulation. It provides liberal rules to select the 
court of a Member State.150 However, in relation to the Dutch WCAM, it is 
doubtful whether the opt-out scheme would suffice to fulfill the requirement of 
true consent.151 In legal literature, it has been argued with reference to the Gerling 
case152 of the CJEU that interested parties in the WCAM scheme are likely to be 
bound as non-party beneficiaries on whose behalf the choice of court agreement 
has been breached.153 However, this case concerned the situation where the 
beneficiary actively invoked the choice of forum agreement to bring proceedings 
in another court as an alternative to the otherwise applicable rules of 
jurisdiction.154 Other case law seems to be more restrictive in relation to third 
parties, particularly where weaker parties (e.g., consumers, insured 
parties/beneficiaries) are concerned.155 Additionally, the general E.U. ban on opt-
out schemes seems not to favor the binding force of a choice of court in relation 
to an interested party that did not explicitly opt out. In Dutch practice, the 
inclusion of a choice of court clause in the settlement agreement is not (yet) 
standard. 
As a matter restricting jurisdiction, the rules on parallel proceedings pose 
challenges. Articles 27-30 Brussels I provide a rather stringent regime on a ‘first 
come, first serve basis.’156 The issue could arise where litigants, groups of 
 
148. Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735. 
149. See infra Part III.C. 
150. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 8. 
151. See, e.g., Lein, supra note 141, at 138; M.F. Poot, Internationale Afwikkeling van Massaschade met 
de Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade, in GESCHRIFTEN VANWEGE DE VERENIGING CORPORATE 
LITIGATION 2005-2006, 179 (M. Holtzer, et al. eds., 2006).  
152. Case 201/82, Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro 
dello Stato, 1983 E.C.R. 2503. 
153. See Astrid Stadler, Die Grenzüberschreitende Durchsetzbarkeit von Sammelklagen, in AUF DEM 
WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 159 (Matthias Casper, et al. eds., 2009) (discussing 
enforceability of class action agreements though not specifically in relation to the WCAM); VAN LITH, supra 
note 104. 
154. See generally Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG, E.C.R. 2503. 
155. See, e.g., Case C-112/03, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux v. Axa Belgium, 2005 E.C.R. I-
3707. This case was, however, distinct from the Gerling case, supra note 152. It concerned the exception to the 
prohibition of choice of forum clauses in (consumer) insurance contracts, where the choice of court is in favor 
of the court of the common residence of the parties. The Court ruled that a choice of court cannot be invoked 
against a third-party beneficiary of the (group) insurance contract, where it would undermine the objective of 
protection of the weaker party (which was the case in this situation, since the beneficiary was domiciled in 
another Member State).  
156. For extensive discussion on this matter, see generally Justine N. Stefanelli, Parallel Litigation and 
Cross-Border Collective Actions Under the Brussels I Framework: Lessons From Abroad, in 
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litigants, or interested parties are (potentially) involved in collective actions or 
settlements pursued in different Member States, or where an individual litigant 
starts proceedings in another Member State. To apply the rules on lis pendens, 
Article 27 requires that the claim concerns the same cause of action and the same 
parties.157 In the Tatry case, the CJEU ruled that both the object and the cause of 
action must be common in the parallel proceedings.158 The cause of the WCAM 
obviously is the mass tort. However, in view of the specific object of the WCAM 
procedure, i.e., to obtain a binding declaration of the settlement, it is questionable 
whether a situation of lis pendens would occur if the competing procedure is a 
collective action for damages.159 Additionally, it is doubtful whether the 
requirement that it concerns the same parties is fulfilled in the specific situation 
of opt-out settlements under the Dutch WCAM where the interested parties as 
such are not litigating parties.160 The issue of parallel proceedings has not come 
up in Dutch practice, and it will not be further discussed. 
C. Vesting Jurisdiction in the Shell and Converium Cases 
Of the six settlements that have been declared binding as to date, the question 
of international jurisdiction was addressed in only two cases, namely the Shell 
case and the Converium case.161 Both concerned securities cases where the main 
issue was misleading information provided to the investors.162 In another case, the 
securities lease case Dexia, there were 4,000 Belgian interested parties involved, 
but these were excluded from the settlement in view of particular mandatory 
rules in force in Belgium.163 Clear cross-border aspects were also evident in two 
other cases.164 In the Vedior case, approximately 55% of the interested parties 
were domiciled abroad and in the Vie d’Or case a small minority of the interested 
parties was domiciled outside the Netherlands (approximately 5%).165 However, 
in these cases, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal did not deliberate on the question 
whether it had international jurisdiction.166 This is probably because all the 
 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 143, 143-70 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012). 
157. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at 9. 
158. Case C-406/92, Tatry v. Maciej Rataj, 1994 E.C.R. I-5439. 
159. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 68; Stefanelli, supra note 156, at 146 (referring to the Drouat case, 
Case C-351/96, Drouot Assurances SA v. Consolidated Metallurgical Industries (CMI industrial sites), 1998 
E.C.R. I-3075). In this case the Court ruled that parties can be considered as the same if their interests are 
indissociable. This case concerned a subrogated insurer using this claim as a result of compensating the insured 
party. It is, however, not likely that this situation can be compared to parties in opt-out collective settlements. 
160. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 68-69. 
161. See infra Parts III.C.i-ii. 
162. See infra Parts III.C.i-ii. 
163. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
164. See generally Vie D’Or, supra note 39. 
165. Id. at 43. 
166. Id. 
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participating parties, notably the (allegedly) responsible parties and the 
representatives, were Dutch.167 
1. The Shell Settlement 
The Shell case concerned shareholders, residing all over the world, who had 
suffered financial losses caused by a sudden drop in the price of Shell shares.168 
This was allegedly169 caused by misleading information by Shell on its oil and gas 
reserves. The settlement was concluded on 11 April 2007 between the ad hoc 
Shell Reserves Compensation Foundation, the Dutch Association for 
Shareholders (Vereniging voor Effectenbezitters, “VEB”), two Dutch pension 
funds, on behalf of the injured parties, and the allegedly responsible Shell Group 
(Shell Petroleum NV and Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd).170 The 
settlement excluded U.S. shareholders, since several class actions were pending 
in the United States.171 In the same year, a New Jersey court refused to take 
jurisdiction over non-U.S. shareholders and denied these shareholders their claim 
since Shell did not engage sufficient conduct in the United States for a U.S. court 
to have subject-matter jurisdiction.172 The Dutch settlement is thus 
complementary to the US action. The Amsterdam Court by turn explicitly 
considered the US class action and judgment.173 On 29 May 2001, the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal declared the settlement binding on non US-parties.174 
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal considered that in relation to foreign 
interested parties, jurisdiction can be vested on the basis of Article 3(a) of the 
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, since five of the six requesting parties were 
domiciled in the Netherlands.175 As far as the interested parties who were 
domiciled in an E.U. or EFTA Member State, the court considered that the 
Brussels I Regulation or Lugano Convention was applicable, since it concerns a 
civil and commercial matter.176 It is clear that the Court regards the interested 
parties as the defendant, but it did not provide further reasoning on this point.177 
The court continued that in relation to the Dutch interested parties/defendants, 
Article 2 Brussels I Regulation and Lugano Convention provides a basis for 
 
167. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20. 
168. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
169. By concluding the settlement the company does not admit liability.  
170. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20. 
171. Id. 
172. In re Royal Dutch Shell Transport Securities Litigation, 522 F.Supp.2d 712 (D.N.J. 2007). 
173. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
174. Id. 
175. See supra note 127 for the contents of this Dutch provision. 
176. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
177. See generally id. 
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jurisdiction.178 These concerned at least one Dutch bank (the Dexia bank) and 751 
other (legal) persons.179 
In relation to the non-Dutch interested parties/defendants, the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal used Article 6(1) Brussels I to vest jurisdiction.180 The court 
rather extensively deliberated on the requirement that the claims are so closely 
connected that hearing them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments is expedient. It considered that if claims for a binding declaration or 
similar (declaratory) claims would be brought in different Member States, there 
would be a great risk that the cases would be decided differently. The court 
further considered that the interests served by Article 6(1) cannot be undermined 
by the fact that the binding declaration might change the applicable law, in view 
of a choice of law clause for Dutch law included in the settlement. Neither does 
the fact that if the English courts would recognize the judgment; interested 
parties that did not opt-out can no longer seize the English courts. These 
considerations relate to the fact that one of the alleged responsible parties was the 
English company Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd. who had dealt with 
groups of English interested parties. It considered that though the Dutch and 
English Shell company were formally separate legal entities, they had the same 
course and conducted similar actions and maintained single consolidated group 
annual accounts. 
The court rather extensively deliberated on the requirement that the claims 
are so closely connected that hearing them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments is expedient. It considered that if claims for a binding 
declaration or similar (declaratory) claims would be brought in different Member 
States, there would be a great risk that the cases would be decided differently.181 
The court further considered that the interests that Article 6(1) serves could not 
be undermined by the fact that the binding declaration might change the 
applicable law, in view of a choice of law clause for Dutch law included in the 
settlement.182 Neither does the fact that if the English courts would recognize the 
judgment, interested parties that did not opt-out can no longer seize the English 
courts.183 These considerations relate to the fact that one of the alleged 
responsible parties was the English company Shell Transport and Trading 
Company Ltd., who had dealt with groups of English interested parties.184 Though 
the Dutch and English Shell companies were formally separate legal entities, they 
 
178. See generally id. 
179. See generally id.  
180. See generally id.  
181. Id. at 5.21. 
182. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7, at 5.23, 5.24. 
183. Id. at 5.23.  
184. Id. at 5.22.  
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had the same course and conducted similar actions and maintained single 
consolidated group annual accounts.185 
2. The Converium Settlement 
The second case is the Converium case, which in view of the adopted wide 
jurisdictional reach has been extensively debated and criticized, both in Dutch 
doctrine and abroad.186 In this case, the responsible parties were a Swiss 
reinsurance company, Converium Holding AG (currently known as SCOR 
Holding AG) and the Swiss company Zurich Financial Service Ltd. that sold 
shares for Converium.187 It sold shares of stocks listed on the SWX Swiss 
Exchange (“SWX”) and on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).188 
Investors suffered losses as a result of alleged misstatements by these companies, 
causing the share prices to drop.189 Class actions were brought in the United 
States, which were consolidated in the Southern District Court of New York.190 In 
2008, that court declined subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to foreign class 
members buying shares on the SWX.191 Two later U.S. settlements were also 
confined to U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents buying on the NYSE.192 On 8 
July 2010, the Converium settlement in the Netherlands was concluded for non-
U.S. shareholders that had bought shares on the SWX.193 The ad hoc Converium 
Foundation, incorporated in the Netherlands and the Dutch Shareholders 
association (VEB) were the representatives in the case.194 Of the approximately 
12,000 interested parties, 8,500 were Swiss residents and 1,500 U.K. residents.195 
Only 3% of the interested parties were resident in the Netherlands.196 In an 
interim decision of 12 November 2010, the Amsterdam Court provisionally 
accepted jurisdiction, and it upheld this in its final decision of 17 January 2012, 
declaring the settlements binding.197 
The Amsterdam Court provided an extensive reasoning to justify its 
international jurisdiction.198 Before going into the details of the applicable 
jurisdiction rules, the court explicated that a request to declare the settlement 
 
185. Id. at 5.26. 
186. Kramer, supra note 6, at 79. 
187. Converium, supra note 8. 
188. Id. at 2.1. 
189. Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 177. 
190. Converium, supra note 8, at 5.2.1. 
191. Id. at 2.2. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 1. 
194. Id. at 10.4. 
195. Kramer, supra note 6, at 63, 78. 
196. Id. at 78. 
197. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.14.  
198. Kramer, supra note 6, at 79. 
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binding under the WCAM scheme has two main purposes. The first one is to 
secure the binding force of the obligation to pay compensation to the victims.199 
The second aim is to ensure that the interested parties (beneficiaries) could no 
longer initiate proceedings against the allegedly liable parties.200 The Court 
underlines that the settlement is complementary to actions and settlements in the 
United States, from which non-U.S. parties and parties that did not buy shares on 
the NYSE but on the SWX were excluded.201 In view of the restriction of the right 
of access to justice as a result of binding declaration and the right to be heard—as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), the Dutch Constitution and the Rv (Dutch Civil Code of 
Procedure)—the Court states that it is essential that the interested parties can 
express their views on the question of jurisdiction.202 In line with the Shell case, 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal bases its jurisdiction on the of the Brussels I 
Regulation (in relation to parties domiciled in the European Union), on the 
Lugano Convention (in relation to interested parties domiciled in Switzerland), as 
well as Dutch internal jurisdiction rules (in relation to interested parties that were 
domiciled outside the European Union or Lugano States).”203 
As in the Shell case, it alleged that the interested parties are to be regarded as 
‘defendants’ and this provided jurisdiction for the Dutch Court in relation to the 
approximately 200 Dutch (known) interested parties.204 This also created 
jurisdiction for the other interested parties pursuant to Article 6(1) Brussels I.205 
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal “considered that it concerned a collection of 
claims whereby the defendants would—once the settlement was declared 
binding—no longer be entitled to bring proceedings in any other court.”206 As in 
the Shell case, the court reasoned that bringing the claim in different Member 
States would result in different and thus irreconcilable judgments.207 The close 
connection and the sound administration of justice justify adopting jurisdiction 
over the other approximately 11,800 interested parties as well, according to the 
Court.208 
Probably realizing that these bases were rather weak in view of the very 
small number of Dutch interested parties, the Court additionally turned to Article 
5(1) Brussels I concerning contractual claims to found jurisdictions.209 For this 
 
199. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.8. 
200. Id. at 2.10. 
201. Id. at 2.5.  
202. Id. at 2.13; Kramer, supra note 6, at 8. 
203. Kramer, supra note 6, at 79.  
204. Id. at 80. 
205. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.6. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 2.11. 
209. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80. 
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purpose, it did not consider the nature of the underlying claim (which was 
tortious), but focused on the settlement agreement as the basis of the claim.210 The 
Court referred by analogy to a CJEU ruling on Article 5(3) concerning tortious 
claims, in which it was decided that this provision could also be used as a 
jurisdictional basis if it concerns a preventive action.211 It also mentions another 
CJEU case where the court ruled that Article 5(1) could also be invoked when the 
formation of the contract was contested.212 It argued that the place of performance 
of the obligation to pay compensation was in the Netherlands, since the 
representative organizations were seated in the Netherlands.213 The Court 
concluded that on each of the bases mentioned independently, the Dutch court 
had international jurisdiction.214 
As in the Shell case, in relation to interested parties/defendants that are not 
domiciled in the European Union or the EFTA States, the Amsterdam Court used 
Article 3 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure to establish jurisdiction.215 It 
concluded that in relation to these parties it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 
3(a) since two of the requesting parties (the Converium foundation and the Dutch 
shareholders association) were domiciled in the Netherlands.216 Additionally, it 
used Article 3(c) to establish jurisdiction.217 This article explains that the Dutch 
court has international jurisdiction if the legal proceedings are otherwise 
sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere.218 This is the case, according 
to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, since the performance of the obligations 
arising out of the settlement agreement—payment of damages—was to be carried 
out in the Netherlands.219 This approach is in line with the purpose of the WCAM 
scheme: to declare the settlement binding so that is obtains preclusive effect upon 
all interested parties that did not opt out.220 However, the link with the 
Netherlands is extremely weak and the reasoning somewhat artificial.221 It 
remains to be seen whether this would stand the jurisdictional review in case the 
responsible party seeks recognition to invoke res iudicata against a party 
initiating litigation in another country.222 
 
210. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.8. 
211. Case C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel, 2002 E.C.R. I-8111, I-
8124, I-8142.  
212. Case 38/81, Effer SpA v. Hans-Joachim Kantner, 1982 E.C.R. 825, 832. 
213. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.9. 
214. Id. at 2.14. 
215. See supra note 125 for the text of this Dutch provision. 
216. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.12. 
217. Id. 
218. See supra note 127 for the text of this Dutch provision. 
219. Converium, supra note 8, at 2.12. 
220. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 17. 
221. See id. at 58.  
222. See infra Part IV.C. 
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D. Problematic Issues and Further Criticism 
The reasoning of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has two primary problems. 
The first one is the positioning of the interested parties or beneficiaries 
(“belanghebbenden”) as defendants.223 It is questionable whether the concept of 
defendant or person to be sued can be construed so as to cover the interested 
parties in the WCAM scheme.224 The case law of the CJEU does not give 
guidance on this point.225 Views in doctrine differ, though Dutch scholars and 
practitioners generally seem to support the assessment of the Amsterdam Court.226 
The reasoning is that these parties are notified of the request to declare the 
settlement binding, they can raise objections, and have the right to file a petition. 
In addition, the parties’ rights are protected by procedural guarantees and the opt-
out right, and they are regarded as potential defendants or respondents.227 From 
the perspective of the purpose of the WCAM, to get the settlement agreement 
declared binding, this seems reasonable.228 However, from an outsider’s or 
European perspective to regard parties that are au fond beneficiaries of the 
settlement agreement and from a litigation perspective, potential claimants as 
defendants might very well not be acceptable.229 At the same time, it is clear that 
the Brussels I Regulation does not seem to offer a much better alternative to vest 
jurisdiction, and Article 2 is the main rule that should accommodate all types of 
cases.230 In the WCAM scheme, surely the allegedly responsible party is also not 
intended to be regarded as a defendant.231 
The second problematic issue is the application of the international 
jurisdiction rules relating to the subject-matter, as included in Article 5 Brussels I 
Regulation.232 In the Converium case, the Court used Article 5(1) on contract 
jurisdiction as a basis, regarding the settlement agreement as a contract sui 
generis.233 The CJEU has ruled that the term “contract” has to be interpreted 
 
223. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 80. 
224. This qualification is also remarkable in view of a ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in a corporate 
petition case, where it explicitly disregarded the domicile of the interested parties for the purpose of the 
Brussels I jurisdiction rules. See HR 25 juni 2010, NJ 2010, 370 m.nt. (Neth.).  
225. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 38.  
226. See Maurice V. Polak, Ledereen en Overal? Internationaal Privaatrecht Rond Massaclaims, 81 NJB 
2346, 2349 (2006); Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, International Class Action Settlements in 
the Netherlands Since Converium, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES, CLASS AND GROUP 
ACTIONS 2014, no. 11 (2013), available at http://www.mondaq.com/x/270462/international+trade+investment/ 
International+Class+Action+Settlements+In+The+Netherlands+Since+Converium. Contra VAN LITH, supra 
note 104, at 42-45. 
227. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 38. 
228. Kramer, supra note 6, at 88. 
229. Id. 
230. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 39. 
231. Id. at 38-39. 
232. Id. at 42. 
233. See Converium, supra note 8; See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43.  
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autonomously, meaning “obligations entered into by free will.”234 In general, the 
CJEU uses a restrictive interpretation.235 For example, pre-contractual liability is 
not to be regarded as a contractual matter.236 The settlement agreement only 
becomes a binding contract towards the interested parties, once it has been 
declared binding, and it may be doubted whether this head of jurisdiction can be 
used.237 
The wide jurisdictional reach coupled with the general attractiveness of the 
Dutch WCAM scheme has resulted in “class settlement tourism” to the 
Netherlands.238 It is highly controversial whether the way in which the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal establishes jurisdiction is acceptable.239 
Additionally, Dutch practice has resulted in forum shopping, as evidenced in the 
Converium case, a phenomenon that contradicts the European civil justice 
system.240 The wide jurisdictional reach of the Amsterdam court has been 
criticized in the Netherlands and in other countries.241 For example, a Latin-
American commentator stated “Amsterdam is aggressively vying to establish 
itself as a hub for worldwide class action settlements.”242 A Belgian commentator 
also criticized the way the Dutch court underpinned its jurisdiction, but was more 
mild in his opinion to state that “I prefer to believe that the Amsterdam judges 
worked on the basis of sincere belief that their solution was the best possible one 
in the given circumstances.”243  
 
234. Case 34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging, 
1983 E.C.R. 987; Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces 
SA, 1992 E.C.R I-3967; see also VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43-44. 
235. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 44. 
236. Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 2002 E.C.R. I-7357.  
237. In a Dutch commentary, it has also been argued that the location of the obligation in question within 
the meaning of Art. 5(1) has to be decided in accordance with the lex causae and that the applicable Dutch law 
(Art. 6:116, BW) refers to the place of creditors; in other words the domicile of the interested parties and not 
that of the Converium Foundation. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 52-53. However, according to CJEU 
Tessili, Case 12/76, Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1481, parties can also stipulate the place of 
performance. The ad hoc establishment of the party bearing the obligation to pay in the Netherlands and further 
stipulations on payment, may be regarded as a choice for the place of performance. See Case 12/76, Tessili v. 
Dunlop, 1976 E.C.R. 1473; Converium, supra note 8. 
238. Jeroen Kortmann, Case Note: Converium, 46 JOR 448, 462 (2011). 
239. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80.  
240. Resolution on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
P7_TA0021, no. 26 (2012). Specifically in relation to collective redress, the European Parliament in its 
Resolution of 2012, no. 26, points out that a rush to the court (forum shopping) should be prevented. Id. See 
also the summary of the public consultation on collective redress. Hess et al., supra note 62, at 13.  
241. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80. For a critical review in the Netherlands, see VAN LITH, supra note 104, 
at 23. 
242. Gidi, supra note 14, at 953.  
243. Benoit Allemeersch, Transnational Class Settlements: Lessons from “Converium”, in COLLECTIVE 
ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? (Stefan Wrbka, Steven 
Van Uytsel, Mathias Siems (eds), Cambridge University Press 2012) 364, 384.  
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The way the Amsterdam Court applied the European jurisdiction rules is not 
entirely convincing, but the Brussels I rules are simply not well suited to 
accommodate the WCAM scheme.244 The application of both Article 2 and 
Article 6(1) is as a result problematic, whereas the contract and tort jurisdiction 
under Article 5 also pose difficulties. As was mentioned earlier, the opt-out 
nature of the WCAM scheme also casts doubt on the validity of an eventual 
choice of court rule under Article 23 Brussels I Regulation.245 Though including 
such a choice of court rule in the settlement agreement might be wise, it is not 
clear whether choice of court would stand the test if such a case would end in the 
CJEU. The Dutch Court should submit preliminary questions to the CJEU to 
resolve these matters.246 This inevitably involves the risk that the Dutch WCAM 
practice will be restricted.247 
Apart from the European intricacies, it is submitted that the Dutch court has 
stretched its jurisdiction to the limits and perhaps even beyond, in comparison 
with the United States.248 It is advisable to adopt a more reticent approach to the 
jurisdictional question in future cases.249 In this regard, it is noteworthy that in 
June 2013, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice reflected on the matter in 
response to a question of Members of Parliament.250 The question related to 
concerns on the wide territorial reach of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the 
Converium case.251 The Minister replied that the Court had applied the existing 
jurisdiction rules, and that it is primarily a European matter.252 However, the 
Minister promised to critically follow the developments and to review the 
situation in two years.253 The Minister further stressed that there has only been 
one case where there were limited connections with the Netherlands, and that 
none of the (interested) parties concerned raised objections against the adoption 
of jurisdiction by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.254 
Meanwhile, it is not to be expected that the European legislature will further 
regulate the matter of international jurisdiction in the near future.255 In the recast 
of Brussels I, collective redress and the necessity to include special rules was 
discussed,256 but not followed-up. As discussed, the Commission’s 
 
244. Kramer, supra note 6, at 80. 
245. See supra Part III.B. 
246. Kramer, supra note 6, at 81.  
247. See id. 
248. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 50-54. 
249. Kramer, supra note 6, at 81.  
250. Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2012-2013, 33126 no. C (Memorie van Antwoord), 
1-2.  
251. Id. 
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 2. 
254. Id.  
255. Kramer, supra note 6, at 64.  
256. See Commission Green Paper on Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction 
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Communication on collection redress refers to the Brussels I Regulation that 
should be “fully exploited,” and the Commission refrains from further regulating 
the matter.257 Solutions proposed in the legal literature concentrate on creating a 
single forum as much as possible.258 This could be the place where the greater 
part of the damage occurred,259 the place where the greater part of the injured 
parties (in the WCAM the interested parties/beneficiaries) are domiciled,260 or the 
debtor’s home forum, respectively the centre of the debtor’s main interest 
(“COMI”).261 The court of the place where most of the injured parties are situated 
would be preferable for the purpose of investor’s protection and would be most 
in line with the Brussels I scheme.262 However, this does not provide easy 
solutions where the groups of injured parties are more-or-less equally spread and 
are domiciled in many different countries.263 It is submitted that for the purpose of 
legal certainty, simplicity, and to facilitate a settlement and damage scheduling, 
the COMI is to be preferred.264 However, this would imply that foreign allegedly 
responsible parties, such as Converium, are no longer admitted to the WCAM 
scheme.265 
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS 
A. Relevance of Recognition and Enforcement and Applicable Rules 
The question on the recognition and enforcement of Dutch WCAM 
settlements, similarly to U.S. class settlements, is often viewed from a 
fundamental perspective.266 It is sometimes argued that the specific features, 
particularly the opt-out nature, would be irreconcilable with central values 
 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 11, COM (2009) 175 
final (Apr. 21, 2009) (“it should be reflected whether specific jurisdiction rules are necessary for collective 
actions”). 
257. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
258. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 58-61; Lein, supra note 141, at 141-42; see also Communication from 
the Commission, supra note 2, at 13. 
259. This could be achieved by adapting Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation; see VAN LITH, supra 
note 104, at 42.  
260. See Commission Green Paper on Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 256, at 13. 
261. This concept is also used in Article 3 of the EU Insolvency Regulation. Council Regulation 
1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). Additionally, it has been suggested, to create a special judicial panel for 
cross-border collective actions within the CJEU. See Hess et al., supra note 62, at 13; See Communication from 
the Commission, supra note 2, at 13. 
262. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 13 
263. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 43.  
264. Id. at 48. 
265. Kramer, supra note 6, at 79. 
266. Id. at 64-65. 
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regarding a fair trial or due process.267 In a practical sense, the question can arise 
when an interested party seeks recognition or enforcement of the settlement in 
another Member State, or outside the European Union, in another country.268 This 
will occur only in the unlikely event that the responsible party does not live up to 
its obligations under the settlement.269 More important is the situation in which a 
victim initiates an individual action against the responsible party in another 
Member State, claiming that he is not bound by the settlement.270 This raises the 
question concerning recognition of the settlement and preclusive effect of a court 
approval of such a settlement.271 
Within the European Union, the Brussels I Regulation is applicable as 
between the Member States.272 In the European Union, the free movement of 
judgments is of particular importance.273 It is sometimes regarded as a fifth, 
besides the old four freedoms that aim to support the proper functioning of the 
internal market.274 The full recognition and enforcement of both judgments and 
extrajudicial decisions, based upon the premise of mutual trust, have gained even 
more prominence, and judicial cooperation was intensified pursuant to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1997, to establish a European judicial area.275 This has also 
resulted in the policy to gradually abolish intermediate measures (i.e., exequatur) 
for the enforcement of judgments in another Member State.276 Exequatur will also 
be abolished in the Brussels I Regulation as a result of the recast.277 The Brussels 
I-bis Regulation will also amend the rules on the enforcement of settlements.278 
The current Brussels I Regulation contains particular grounds of refusal that may 
pose challenges to the recognition and enforcement of Dutch mass settlement.279 
The Brussels I-bis Regulation will retain the existing grounds of refusal at the 
stage of enforcement.280 
 
267. Hess, et al., supra note 62, at 8.  




272. Id. at 26. 
273. X.E. Kramer, Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation: Towards a New Balance 
between Mutual Trust and National Control over Fundamental Rights, 60 NETHERLANDS INT’L L REV. 343, 347 
(2013). 
274.  The other freedoms being the freedom of persons, capital, goods and services. Kramer, supra note 
6, at 65. 
275. See id. at 65-67. 
276. Kramer, supra note 273, at 345. 
277. See supra Part III.A.; see also Kramer, supra note 273, at 345. 
278. Kramer, supra note 273, at 355. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 356. 
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B. The Brussels I Scheme on Recognition and Enforcement281 
The Brussels I Regulation does not only fall short in accommodating 
jurisdiction in collective redress, but the rules on the recognition and enforcement 
are not well suited either.282 Apart from the remark in the Recommendation that 
the Brussels I Regulation applies, the E.U. policy maker did not provide further 
guidance.283 It is noteworthy that in the Commission proposal on the recast of 
Brussels I, judgments in collective redress were excluded from the abolition of 
exequatur.284 The Commission considered that the stakeholders expressed 
concerns in relation to the enforcement of collective redress judgments and that 
the procedures vary widely per Member State in relation to the scope of those 
procedures, which victims these cover, the (public) authorities involved, and 
whether they proceed from an opt-in or opt-out model.285 Mutual trust in this 
matter is apparently lacking.286 In the final version new Regulation (Brussels I-
bis), this exclusion is deleted because the grounds of refusal have been retained 
as a safety valve to revoke enforcement.287 
1. Recognition and Enforcement of Court Judgments 
Regarding the judicial decision to declare the settlement binding under the 
WCAM scheme, the question is whether it is a “judgment” within the meaning of 
Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation. Doctrinally, views differ on this matter.288 
A leading ruling of the CJEU is Solo Kleinmotoren.289 In this case it stated that in 
order to be a “judgment” for the purposes of the Convention, the decision must 
 
281. This section is largely based on Kramer, supra note 6, at 82-89 with the approval of the editors and 
the publisher.  
282. See inter alia Watt, supra note 129, at 111; see inter alia Burkard Hess, Cross-Border Litigation and 
the Regulation Brussels I, IPRAX 2010, at 115. 
283. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
284. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), at 5, COM (2010) 
748 final (Dec. 14, 2010). 
285. Id. at 7. 
286. Id. 
287. Kramer, supra note 273, at 356. 
288. Kramer, supra note 6, at 83; Polak, supra note 226, at 2353; Arons & Van Boom, supra note 17, at 
880-81; Astrid Stadler, Grenzüberschreitender Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa, 2009 JURISTENZEITUNG 
121, 126; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 108-11; Axel Halfmeier, Recognition of a WCAM Settlement in 
Germany, 2012 NEDERLANDS INT’L PRIVAATRECHT 176, 178-80. Negative: Watt, supra note 129, at 114 (in 
relation to class action settlements in general). In doubt: Burkhard Hess, A Coherent Approach to European 
Collective Redress, in EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 107, 114 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva 
Lein eds., 2012); PATRICK WAUTELET, BRUSSELS I REGULATION, comments, at art. 32, no. 39 (Ulrich Magnus 
& Peter Mankowski eds., 2011). Bariatti, supra note 14, focuses only on the question of whether the settlement 
is to be regarded as a court settlement within the meaning of article 58 Brussels I, and seems not even to 
consider it a possibility that the declaration qualifies as a judgment. 
289. Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch, 1994 E.C.R. I-2237. 
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emanate from a judicial body of a Contracting State, deciding on its own 
authority, on the issues between the parties.290 That condition is not fulfilled in the 
case of a settlement, even if it was reached in a court of a Contracting State and 
brought legal proceedings to an end.291 Settlements in court are essentially 
contractual in that their terms depend first and foremost on the parties’ 
intention.292 
As for the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, it can be disputed that it acts ex 
officio.293 It is designated by law to decide on the declaration, but the settlement 
as such is reached before the declaration is requested.294 Nevertheless, there is 
room to regard the settlement approval as a judgment.295 The granting of the 
declaration is not just a simple ‘yes or no’ upon formalities. The Court has to 
review a whole range of issues, including whether the requirements regarding 
representativeness have been met, and whether the settlement amount is 
reasonable for each category of victims.296 Interested parties are served and can be 
heard in the proceedings; these are important requirements in view of the 
Denilauler and Gambazzi rulings as part of the right to be heard and respecting 
fundamental procedural rights.297 Throughout the process of approval, the court 
plays an active role in managing the case and in setting procedural requirements, 
e.g., regarding notification.298 It is, therefore, likely that the decision to declare 
the settlement binding is to be regarded as a judgment, and thus be recognized 
and enforceable under the Brussels I Regulation, subject to the applicability of 
the grounds of refusal.299 Furthermore, the obligations of the responsible party 
arising out of the settlement can be enforced.300 
2. Enforcement of Settlements 
Another question, which is particularly important if the court approval is not 
to be regarded as judgment, is whether the declaration can be regarded as a 
‘settlement’ within the meaning of Article 58 Brussels I. According to this 
provision, the settlement is enforceable under the same conditions as authentic 
instruments.301 Article 57, regarding authentic instruments, refers to the procedure 
 
290. Id. at para. 17. 
291. Id. at para. 18. 
292. Id. 
293. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
294. See id.  
295. See id. 
296. See id. 
297. See Case 125/79, Denilauler v. Couchet, 1979 E.C.R. 1553; Case 394/07, Gambazzi v. Daimler 
Chrysler, 2009 E.C.R. I-2563.  
298. See, e.g., Gambazzi, supra note 297. 
299. See id.  
300. See id.  
301. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58. 
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of Article 38 et seq. regarding the enforcement of judgments; however, the only 
ground of refusal is public policy.302 
There appear to be two problems in relation to applying Article 58 to mass 
settlements, and in particular those reached under the Dutch WCAM. The first is 
that this provision requires that the settlement has been approved by a court in the 
course of proceedings.303 If this requirement is to be understood as having been 
reached in the course of adversarial proceedings, the Dutch settlement would not 
be covered.304 In the earlier referenced Solo Kleinmotoren ruling, the European 
Court of Justice referred to ‘an enforceable settlement reached before a court,’ 
though this was in the context of distinguishing the settlement in dispute from a 
judgment.305 It also emphasized the contractual nature of the settlement in the 
sense of Article 58, whereas the court approval aims to create preclusive effect 
for the entire group of interested parties.306 The mass settlement itself is reached 
between the representative(s) and the responsible party.307 In view of this lack of 
clarity, the new Brussels I bis Regulation includes a definition in Article 2, 
subsection (b).308 It defines the court settlement as a settlement “which has been 
approved by a court of a Member State or concluded before a court of a Member 
State in the course of proceedings.”309 This will definitely cover the court 
approval of mass settlements, and it is likely that the current Brussels I 
Regulation will also be interpreted in this light, since the definition is a 
clarification rather than an amendment. 
The second problem with the application of Article 58 Brussels I, and one 
that the corresponding Article 59 Brussels I bis does not resolve, is that it refers 
exclusively to the enforcement of settlements.310 It provides that settlements 
enforceable in the Member State of origin shall be enforceable (Brussels I bis: 
enforced) in the State addressed (Brussels I bis: in the other Member States) 
under the same conditions as authentic instruments.311 Likewise, Article 57 
Brussels I and the corresponding Article 58 in Brussels I bis on authentic 
instruments only mention enforcement and not recognition.312 The reason is that 
the Brussels provision on settlements is concerned with the enforcement of a 
settlement agreement as a contract.313 However, as regards mass settlements, the 
 
302. See id. at art. 57. 
303. See id. at art. 58. 
304. See Watt, supra note 129, at 114; see VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 111-15; see Halfmeier, supra 
note 288, at 178-80.  
305. See Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch, 1994 E.C.R. I-2237. 
306. See id. 
307. See, e.g., id.  
308. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 2(b).  
309. Id. 
310. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58. 
311. See id. 
312. See id. at art. 57; Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 119, at art. 58. 
313. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 58. 
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primary concern is not the enforceability of the settlement between the 
contracting parties; it is to recognize preclusive effect as a result of the binding 
nature of the settlement in relation to all the interested parties that did not opt 
out.314 For this reason, the provision on settlements is probably of little use to 
facilitate the mass settlement. 
3. Public Policy and Other Grounds of Refusal 
If the mass settlement were to be regarded as a judgment under the Brussels I 
Regulation, its effect can nevertheless be mitigated if the grounds of refusal as 
laid down in Articles 34 and 35 are invoked.315 Under the current rules, these 
grounds can be invoked to appeal the declaration of enforceability in declaratory 
proceedings regarding the recognition or where recognition is important as an 
incidental question.316 Under the Brussels I bis Regulation, the exequatur will be 
abolished, but identical grounds of refusal can be applied on application by a 
party against whom enforcement is sought.317 On application by an interested 
party, these grounds of refusal will also apply to the recognition of judgments.318 
In relation to mass limitation, the issue of recognition is most likely to arise when 
an interested party that did not opt out wishes to initiate individual proceedings in 
another Member State.319 
Articles 34 and 35 include the public policy exception, improper service, 
irreconcilability of judgments, and violation of specific exclusive jurisdiction 
rules.320 For the purpose of Dutch mass settlements in view of the opt-out 
character of the procedure, public policy within the meaning of Article 34(1) and 
proper service as included in Article 34(2) are particularly important.321 In view 
of the criticism on the wide jurisdiction of the Dutch court in the Converium 
case, it should be noted that a violation of the jurisdiction rules is, in general, not 
a ground to refuse recognition or enforcement, unless particular exclusive or 
protective (consumer) jurisdiction rules apply.322 
In relation to public policy, the starting point is that the law of the Member 
State where recognition and enforcement is sought becomes decisive.323 However, 
 
314. See generally id. 
315. See id. at arts. 34-35. 
316. See id. at arts. 33, 45. 
317. See Regulation 1215/2012, supra note 13, at art. 46. 
318. See id. at art. 45. 
319. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 45(1)(a). 
320. See id. at arts. 34-35. 
321. See generally id.  
322. See id. at art. 35(3) (stating that the test of public policy may not be applied to the rules relating to 
jurisdiction).  
323. See id. at art. 34. 
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it must concern a manifest breach of public policy.324 The CJEU has repeatedly 
ruled that this ground of refusal should be interpreted strictly.325 It is not available 
in the case of a discrepancy between national rules; it should concern a manifest 
breach of a fundamental principle.326 A violation of Article 6 European 
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) or Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union will generally qualify as such.327 This 
ground of refusal has been accepted only in incidental cases.328 Can the opt-out 
nature of the Dutch mass settlement mechanism be regarded as breaching a 
fundamental principle? In the Dutch literature, this question has been answered in 
the negative, which is backed up by certain non-Dutch scholars.329 However, most 
other scholars have expressed serious doubts regarding the compatibility of the 
opt-out nature with domestic or European public policy.330 In this context, it is 
interesting to note that the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article 
6 ECHR dealt with the issue of collective procedures in the case Lithgow v. 
United Kingdom.331 The Court stated that the right to an individual procedure may 
be limited or restricted if such a restriction serves a legitimate goal and is not 
disproportionate.332 In a later case, it concluded that Article 6 had not been 
violated, since “in proceedings involving a decision for a collective number of 
individuals, it is not always required that every individual is heard before a 
court.”333 The WCAM can be said to fulfil a legitimate goal, namely, to enable 
compensation of large groups of victims by means of a settlement.334 The high 
number of victims and the relatively low value of the claim per victim make 
 
324. See id. 
325. See C-394/07, Gambazzi v. Daimler Chrysler Can. Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-2563; C-7/98, Krombach v. 
Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; C-38/98, Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-2973; Case 145/86, Hoffmann v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645. 
326. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 34. 
327. See id. at art. 47. 
328. See generally, C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner Sinto 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-7357. 
329. Arons & Van Boom, supra note 17, at 881-82; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 124-30. See also 
Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 178-80, who concludes that this procedure does not constitute a violation of 
German public policy. 
330. Specifically in relation to the Dutch WCAM: Bariatti, supra note 14, at 335-36; Astrid Stadler, 
Kollektiver Rechtsschutz und Revision der Brüssel I-Verordnung, in RECHT OHNE GRENZEN, FESTSCHRIFT 
KAISSIS 951, 957 (Reinhold Geimer & Rolf A. Schütze eds., 2012). In general in relation to opt-out collective 
redress mechanisms: Mihail Danov, The Brussels I Regulation: Cross-Border Collective Redress Proceedings 
and Judgments, 6 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 359, 388-91 (2010); Hess, supra note 282, at 120; Duncan Fairgrieve, 
The Impact of the Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition Rules on Collective Actions, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 171, 178-86 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).  
331. See Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 182. See generally Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 329 (1986). 
332. Lithgow, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 329. 
333. Wendenburg v. Germany, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 
334. See generally id. 
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individual litigation an unreasonable option.335 This case law does not explicitly 
address the opt-out mechanism.336 
It is clear that the current European tide is against the opt-out system, as the 
Commission Recommendation evidences.337 This led Hess to conclude that opt-
out mechanisms are not in accordance with current European procedural law.338 
In spite of the substantive and procedural checks and balances in Dutch 
legislation, recognition and enforcement of the decision to declare the settlement 
binding is therefore not guaranteed in (all) the other Member States. 
A specific ground of refusal relates to proper service, enumerated in Article 
34(2) Brussels I.339 It concerns the situation in which the judgment was given in 
default of appearance, and the document instituting proceedings was not served 
in a timely manner and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for his 
defense.340 The question is whether this provision applies to the Dutch settlements 
mechanism.341 Under Dutch law, the decision to declare the settlement binding is 
not a default judgment, but in view of the autonomous interpretation, this will not 
be an obstacle.342 A more important issue is that application of this provision 
requires that the interested parties can indeed be regarded as defendants within 
the meaning of Brussels I Regulation. If it were to be applicable within the E.U., 
the Service Regulation would apply. In relation to interested parties that are 
unknown, or where the domicile is unknown, it is important that all efforts be 
made to actually reach the defendant.343 In the Dexia case, the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeal underlined the importance of a proper notice being given to the 
interested parties by reference to Article 6 ECHR.344 In this case, the Court found 
it sufficient that the group as a whole had been served properly.345 However, in 
later cases the relevant European and international instruments were consistently 
applied, and extensive efforts were made to serve the parties and to reach 
unknown parties or parties with unknown domiciles.346 Particularly in the Shell 
 
335. See generally id. 
336. See generally id. 
337. See supra Part II.B. 
338. Hess, supra note 282, at 120. 
339. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 121, at art. 34(2). 
340. See id. 
341. See Halfmeier, supra note 288, at 176, 183, who concludes that this provision is not applicable. 
342. Stéphanie Francq, Article 34, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BRUSSELS I REGULATION 644, 680 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2nd rev. ed. 2012).  
343. See generally European Parliament and Council Regulation 1393/2007, at art. 19, 2007 O.J. (L 324) 
79, 84 (EC), repealing Council Regulation 1348/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37 (EC); Case C-327/10, Hypotecní 
Banka, a.s. v. Lindner, 2011 E.C.R. I-11543; Case C-292/10, G v. de Visser, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000. 
344. See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
345. Rv arts.1013(5) and 1017(3) (Neth.) generally require service by ordinary mail, unless the court 
decides differently. However, in relation to parties domiciled or residence abroad, the E.U. Service Regulation 
and the Hague Service Convention will apply and translations to be provided where appropriate.  
346. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; Converium, supra note 8. 
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and Converium cases, the Court gave strict instructions in relation to the 
notification.347 Advertisements were placed in dozens of newspapers, special 
websites were established, and banners were placed on websites.348 Though the 
assessment of an individual case will be a task for the court of the Member State 
where enforcement is sought, it is submitted that in general the notification 
requirements are in compliance with the Brussels I and Service Regulation, and 
should therefore not be an obstacle to the recognition and enforcement of Dutch 
mass settlements. 
C. Recognition and Enforcement in Other Countries 
Outside the European Union and the EFTA, domestic rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or settlements of the country 
where recognition or enforcement is sought will be decisive. General 
requirements pertain to the international jurisdiction of the court that rendered the 
judgment as well as due process and public policy. Specific rules on notification, 
requiring the personal notification of every class member or, in the situation of 
the Dutch WCAM, interested parties, may also be obstacles to the recognition 
and enforcement of Dutch settlements. It is noteworthy that the Recommendation 
on Transnational Groups of the International Law Association (“ILA”) of 2008 
provides that res judicata or enforcement should not be denied because the 
decision was rendered under an opt-out group action model.349 The Guidelines for 
Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments for Collective Redress of the 
International Bar Association (“IBA”), adopted in the same year, seem generally 
more reserved towards opt-out procedures.350 It provides that a court may expect 
its decision to have preclusive effect over absent class members that have been 
given adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to opt out if 
additional conditions arise relating to result of judgment and the 
representativeness.351 The ILA Resolution and IBA guidelines do not specifically 
deal with collective opt-out settlements. 
 
347. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see generally, e.g., Converium, supra note 8. 
348. See generally, e.g., Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see generally, e.g., Converium, supra note 8. 
349. International Civil Litigation and the Interests of the Public: Transnational Group Actions, Report 
and Resolution, ILA, at 24 (2008). Resolution 10.1 reads: “The requested court should not refuse to grant res 
judicata effect or enforce a foreign decision merely because the decision was rendered under an opt-out group 
action model.” 
350. See generally Guidelines for Recognising and Enforcing Foreign Judgments for Collective Redress, 
IBA (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=C1F679E5-7F71-4A19-
B3F6-DF5BC79C07A9. 
351. Id. at 13-14. Guideline 1.02 reads: “It is reasonable for a court issuing a collective redress judgment 
to expect its judgment to be given preclusive effect in respect of absent claimants by the jurisdictions in which 
the absent claimants reside if, inter alia: (i) the results obtained for absent claimants are not patently inadequate 
in the circumstances; (ii) the interests of absent claimants have been adequately represented; and (iii) absent 
claimants have been given adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to opt out.” 
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In relation to the somewhat similar U.S. settlements, it has been argued that 
these will not be recognized and enforced in Latin America.352 That commentator 
also refers to the Netherlands in relation to the Converium case as a “judicial 
hellhole.”353 As to the United States, it is likely that it is willing to recognize and 
enforce Dutch WCAM settlements. In the Shell case brought in the U.S., the New 
Jersey Court, when excluding non-U.S. litigants from its jurisdiction, considered 
that the non U.S.-claimants are not without recourse, since a settlement had been 
brought to the Dutch court on their behalf for a binding declaration.354 However, 
it is very unlikely that the U.S. courts will grant effect to Dutch WCAM 
settlements if these were to include U.S.-parties, particularly if it would concern 
investors that bought shares on the U.S. market. It may be assumed that it will 
require the Dutch court to respect similar jurisdictional limits as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has imposed in the Morrison case.355 Vice versa, the Dutch court 
has been willing to recognize a U.S. class settlement.356 As discussed earlier, in 
both the Shell case and the Converium case, Dutch settlements were concluded 
complementary to U.S. class actions and settlement, and in that regard the U.S. 
and Dutch systems are in communication with each other. 
V. QUESTIONS OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE DUTCH WCAM MECHANISM 
A. The Issue of the Applicable Law and Applicable Rules 
The law applicable to a collective settlement under the Dutch WCAM has 
different aspects. First, it is relevant to determine the law applicable to the 
settlement itself as a contract. Second, the law that governs the underlying legal 
relationship, either a tort or a contract, may be relevant. Though the WCAM 
scheme is not designed to establish liability, the law applicable to the underlying 
claims may be of relevance. The most significant issue is the reasonableness of 
the settlement as a prerequisite to declare the settlement binding. Third, it is 
important to distinguish substantive law issues from the law that governs the 
procedural aspects, including the requirement of representativeness. In 
accordance with the lex fori processus rule, Dutch law will naturally govern these 
elements if the request to declare the settlement binding is brought before the 
Dutch court. 
In the Netherlands, the applicable substantive law is to be determined on the 
basis of European choice of law rules, notably the Rome I Regulation 
 
352. Gidi, supra note 14, at 955-56.  
353. Id. at 953. 
354. See supra Part III.C.i. 
355. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd.,130 S. Ct 2869, 2869 (2010). 
356. See generally Ktr.’s-Amsterdam 23 juni 2010, JOR 2010, 225 m.nt. IN Tzankova (SOBI/Deloitte) 
(Neth.). 
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(contractual obligations) and the Rome II Regulation (non-contractual 
obligations).357 In the Netherlands, the admissibility of claims does not depend 
upon the applicable law. Where appropriate, foreign law will be applied, 
including the law applicable to securities liability cases. 
B. Relevant Choice of Law Rules for Mass Securities Claims 
The applicable law to the settlement agreement will be designated on the 
basis of the Rome I Regulation. The main rule pursuant of Article 3 Rome I is 
that the parties can select a choice of law clause for, in principle, any substantive 
law system.358 This choice will not affect the applicable law to the underlying 
legal claims, often arising out of tort.359 If the settlement agreement does not 
include a choice of law, Article 4(2) Rome I will apply.360 This designates the law 
of the habitual residence of the party that is to conduct the characteristic 
performance.361 With regard to the settlement agreement, it is not evident which 
party is to be regarded as the characteristic performer. Most Dutch scholars have 
argued that in the WCAM settlement, this is the party that has to pay 
compensation.362 This will lead to Dutch law where this party, as is the case in 
practice, is a habitual resident in the Netherlands. However, if one were to 
consider that the characteristic performance could not be determined in relation 
to such settlement agreement, the residual rule included in Article 4(4) will be 
applicable. This provision refers to the law that is most closely connected to the 
settlement. Relevant factors to be considered are the place of the underlying mass 
event, or the habitual residence of the majority of the interested parties. In 
practice, the settlement usually includes a choice for Dutch law. However, even 
in the absence of such a clause, it is likely that the Dutch court would apply 
Dutch law either as “place of the party having to perform the payment 
obligation” or the “origin” of the mass settlement. This is important to secure full 
application of the WCAM, including its substantive provisions laid down in the 
Dutch Civil Code. 
With regards to the law applicable to the underlying relationship, it is 
important to decide what the basis of the liability is. If it is based on a contractual 
relationship (breach of contract), the Rome I will be decisive. Thus, the main rule 
will be that the chosen law applies pursuant to Article 3 Rome I, unless it 
concerns a consumer contract within the scope of Article 6(1) Rome I.363 If no 
valid choice of law agreement is made, Article 4 will generally be relevant. 
 
357. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
358. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
359. See Polak, supra note 226. 
360. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
361. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
362. See generally Polak, supra note 226. 
363. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
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Article 4(1)(h) is important for securities litigation.364 It outlines “a multilateral 
system which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple 
third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments” within the 
meaning of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFiD”).365 
According to this provision, the law of that financial market shall be applied.366 
However, in most securities cases, liability will be based on tort, for example 
misleading information (prospectus liability) or fraud.367 In those cases, the Rome 
II Regulation is applicable.368 According to Article 4(1) Rome II, the law of the 
place in which the damage occurs will govern the liability.369 This is “irrespective 
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that 
event occur.”370 In securities liability cases, there is no physical damage, making 
determining the place where the damage occurs more difficult.371 In the 
Kronhofer case, the CJEU ruled in relation to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, that the principal place where investors suffered their financial losses 
is the place where they hold their investment accounts.372 This ruling is also 
relevant for the application of Article 4(1) Rome II.373 In a mass securities case, 
there can be many places where the interested investors hold their accounts; this 
will ultimately lead to the applicability of a multiplicity of laws. Evidently, this 
will cause legal uncertainty for issuers and significantly complicated case 
handling for judges.374 
To avoid the application of many possibly different laws, it has been 
proposed in legal literature to include a new rule that is more suited for securities 
litigation or to extensively apply the escape clause under Article 4(3) Rome II.375 
This provision enables applying the law of another country “[w]here it is clear 
from all the circumstances of the case that” this country is “manifestly more 
 
364. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
365. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 118; European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39, at art. 
4.1(14), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC). 
366. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 118. 
367. See Astrid Stadler, Conflict of Laws in Multinational Collective Actions – a Judicial Nightmare?, in 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 191, 197-98 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012). 
368. Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. It is sometimes claimed that certain securities cases are 
excluded from the scope of the Rome II Regulation since Article 1(2)(d) exempts non-contractual obligations 
‘arising out of the law of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated’. However, the dominant 
view is that this exception does not relate to capital markets liability. Id. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
371. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 197-98. 
372. Case C-168/02, Rudolf Kronhofer v. Marianne Maier and Others, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009 (rejecting to 
regard the domicile of the investor as the place where the damage occurs).  
373.  Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42 (commenting on the connection with the Brussels I 
Regulation). 
374. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 197-201. 
375. Id. at 200-01. 
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closely connected.”376 Such a manifestly closer connection might be based in 
particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract 
(“accessory connection”).377 The more closely connected law could be the law of 
the market affected by the violation (“market place rule”).378 For listed securities, 
this would be the law of the place of the stock exchange, and for other securities, 
the place where the securities were bought, “where a public offer was made or 
where the prospectus [was] published.”379 It has also been suggested to bundle 
liability rules with the applicable disclosure duties.380 This would lead to the law 
of the place where the issuer is incorporated (lex incorporationis) and 
synchronize liability with the Prospectus Directive.381 However, since Article 4(3) 
Rome II Regulation is only to be applied in exceptional circumstances, bundling 
of liability rules with disclosure duties would probably necessitate amending the 
Rome II Regulation.382 
It can be concluded that the current system is far from ideal for an efficient 
handling of mass securities cases.383 Such multiplicity of laws does not only occur 
in securities litigation, but also in other mass harm cases.384 However, as 
discussed earlier, the Commission stated in its Communication that it was not 
“persuaded that it would be appropriate to introduce a specific rule for collective 
claims which would require the court to apply a single law.”385 It added that such 
a rule would lead to uncertainty where it was “not the law of the country of the 
person claiming damages.”386 This last argument is rather strange, because the 
law of the person claiming damages is as such not a connecting factor in the 
existing choice of law rules.387 Since there is no legislative solution expected in 
the near future, stretching the escape clause under Article 4(3) Rome II seems to 
be the most feasible option.388 
  
 
376.  Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42; Stadler, supra note 367, at 201. 
377.  Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42; VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 114. 
378. See inter alia Stadler, supra note 367, at 201. 
379. Id. at 200. 
380. Id.  
381. European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 65 (EC), amended by 
Council Directive 2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC); Stadler, supra note 367, at 200. 
382. Id. at 197. 
383. Id. at 197-201. 
384. Id. 
385. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14; see supra Part II.B.ii. 
386. Communication from the Commission, supra note 2 at 14. 
387. See supra Part V.B. There are exceptions; notably Article 6(1) refers to the law of the habitual residence 
of the consumer in relation to contracts covered by that provision. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6. 
388. See Communication from the Commission, supra note 2, at 14. 
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C. Dutch Practice and Specific Issues in the WCAM 
The issue of applicable law is seldom addressed in Dutch practice regarding 
the WCAM.389 Apart from the first case, the DES case, the settlement agreement 
included a “choice of law clause for Dutch law” in all cases.390 The law applicable 
to the underlying legal relationship among the parties in WCAM cases has not 
explicitly been addressed by the Dutch court in the cases it has dealt with.391 To 
avoid possible complications with the applicable law, in the Dexia case, 
concerning securities lease products, the concluding parties decided to exclude 
Belgian parties before it reached the court.392 It was clear that particular 
mandatory Belgian consumer rules would have prevailed over the less strict 
Dutch laws applicable to the underlying claims.393 As is the case in assessing 
international jurisdiction, the focus of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is on the 
settlement agreements at issue.394 The Court reviews the requirements to declare 
the declaration binding and provides instructions; it does not deal with the 
question of the liability of the allegedly responsible party.395 
However, the law applicable to the underlying legal relationship is of 
importance when assessing the reasonableness of the settlement.396 Article 
7:907(3) of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the request to declare the 
declaration binding shall be rejected if “the amount of the compensation awarded 
is” unreasonable.397 Elements to be considered pursuant to this provision are the 
extent of the damage and the possible causes of the damage.398 To determine if 
the settlement is reasonable, it would be necessary to assess the applicable law in 
 
389. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 113. 
390. Id.  
391. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 77-78; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7; see Vie D’Or, supra note 
39; see Converium, supra note 8; see Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, 2012 NJ, 355 m.nt. 
(Converium/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG). 
392. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 7. 
393. See also VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 20. Apart from Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation, limiting an 
eventual choice of law in respect of the underlying (contractual) claim in contracts falling under the (limited) 
scope of this provision, overriding mandatory rules within the meaning of Article 9 Rome I Regulation and 
Article 16 Rome II Regulation may have to be considered. Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation 
864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
394. Kramer, supra note 6, at 84. 
395. Kaal & Painter, supra note 11, at 167; Kramer, supra note 6, at 84. 
396. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 198. 
397. BW art. 7:907(3) (Neth.). 
398. Id. reads: “The court shall reject the request if: . . . b. the amount of the compensation awarded is not 
reasonable having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease and speed with which the 
compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the damage”. According to Article 7:907(2)(a)-9(d) 
the settlement agreement should also include a description of the groups of interested persons according to the 
seriousness of their loss, an indication of the number of persons in each of these groups, the compensation to be 
awarded to each group, as well as the conditions these persons must fulfill to qualify for the compensation. BW 
art. 7:907(2)(a)-(d) (Neth.). 
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relation to each interested party, or at least each group of parties.399 One might 
even say that this analysis requires the court to take into consideration what the 
potential outcome of litigation would be and to compare that with the 
settlement.400 Though it is accepted in Dutch practice that the applicable law to 
the underlying claims of individual interested parties should be taken into 
account, in practice careful damage scheduling seems to be the solution.401 The 
Dutch legislature rejected a recommendation to include a special rule for foreign 
parties in assessing reasonableness.402 The legislature found it unnecessary since 
many aspects have to be considered in damage calculation, which may naturally 
include the applicable law.403 
It was discussed earlier that procedural matters regulated in the WCAM, such 
as the representation requirements, are to be decided upon Dutch law pursuant of 
the generally accepted lex fori processus rule.404 However, the demarcation 
between procedural and substantive law is not always evident.405 In doctrine the 
limitation periods included in the Dutch Civil Code have been regarded as a 
procedural matter.406 Article 907(5) of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the 
request to declare the settlement binding will interrupt the limitation period.407 
Should a party exercise his opt out right or the request be rejected, a new 
prescription period should be limited to two years.408 This proposal was made in 
order to release the allegedly responsible party from eventual new litigations 
after the collective settlement for a longer period.409 However, in the Rome I and 
Rome II Regulations limitation periods are explicitly mentioned as being covered 
by the applicable substantive law (lex causae), and are thus not to be regarded as 
a procedural matter.410 This means that if an individual party that opted out 
wishes to pursue individual litigation in the Netherlands (or in another E.U. 
Member State) the law applicable to that claim will determine the prescription 
 
399. See Stadler, supra note 367, at 198. 
400. Id.  
401. See VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 13. 
402. See Parliamentary Proceedings, II 2003/04, 29 414, no. 3, 14-15; Arons & Van Boom, supra note 
17, at 864. 
403. See Parliamentary Proceedings, II 2003/04, 29 414, no. 3, 14-15; Arons & Van Boom, supra note 
17, at 115. 
404. See supra Part V.A.  
405. See generally BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.); Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; Regulation 
864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
406. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 119. 
407. BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.). 
408. VAN LITH, supra note 104, at 120. 
409. Id. 
410. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
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period.411 If that happens to be a foreign law with a longer prescription period, 
that law should prevail over the WCAM rules.412 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Collective redress is on the rise in Europe and at present the Netherlands is 
taking the lead in transnational securities mass settlements. It is expected that the 
number of mass securities cases that will be brought in European courts will 
further increase, particularly in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in the Morrison case. The European debate and further legislative activities at the 
E.U. level are hampered by diverging domestic systems, fear of abusive 
litigation, and diverse views on the acceptable model of collective redress. The 
European Commission’s Recommendation of June 2013 is marred by 
compromises and a genuine European procedure of collective action and/or 
settlement is not expected in the near future.413 
The Dutch WCAM system is by and large in compliance with the common 
principles established by the Recommendation.414 However, there are two points 
of possible conflict.415 First, the Netherlands only has a collective settlement 
mechanism and not an accompanying collective action for compensation.416 
Second, the WCAM is based on an opt-out scheme whereas the Recommendation 
strongly proceeds from an opt-in scheme to safeguard litigants’ rights.417 Though 
the Recommendation is in the form of non-binding legislation, it marks the 
current status, and future of, collective redress in Europe.418 Additionally, it may 
influence the acceptance of current cross-border case handling by the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal under the WCAM, which has already been criticized.419 It is 
disappointing that the Recommendation only cursorily deals with cross-border 
aspects of collective redress, considering that these pose real challenges.420 As 
regards to international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement, the 
Commission refers to the use of the Brussels I Regulation.421 In relation to the 
choice of law rules, it takes the view that special rules for collective redress are 
not needed.422 
 
411. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
412. See Regulation 593/2008, supra note 15, at 6; see Regulation 864/2007, supra note 15, at 42. 
413. See supra Part II.B. 
414. See supra Part II.B.i. 
415. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
416. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
417. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
418. See supra Parts I, II.B.ii. 
419. See supra Part II.B.ii 
420. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
421. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
422. See supra Part II.B.ii. 
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The establishment of international jurisdiction of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal to declare a collective settlement binding in accordance with the WCAM 
Act is problematic.423 The Brussels I Regulation has been developed with a view 
to classical party-party litigation and does not sufficiently accommodate 
collective actions or settlements.424 Therefore, a mismatch is evident between the 
specific WCAM design and the defendant-oriented jurisdiction rules of this 
Regulation.425 In the landmark securities cases Shell and Converium, the 
Amsterdam Court has designated the interested parties under the WCAM scheme 
as “defendants.”426 It is controversial whether this is a correct understanding of 
the Brussels I rules since the interested parties are beneficiaries that do not as 
such take part in the procedure.427 In a typical class the allegedly responsible 
party would qualify as defendant, but under the WCAM scheme this is not the 
case, since the responsible party files the petition jointly with the representatives 
of the class.428 This makes the application of Article 2 (court of the defendant) 
and Article 6(1) (multiple defendants) Brussels I problematic.429 In the Converium 
case international jurisdiction was additionally founded on Article 5(1) regarding 
contractual jurisdiction.430 Disregarding the underlying legal relationship, the 
Court took the settlement agreement and the place of performance of the payment 
obligation resulting from the binding declaration as point of departure.431 In the 
Converium case, the connections with the Netherlands were overall very weak 
and this judgment has rightfully been criticized.432 It is submitted that the 
Amsterdam Court overstepped the boundaries of European and internationally 
accepted jurisdictional rules.433 
The recognition and enforcement of the decision to declare the WCAM 
settlement binding also poses challenges.434 Particularly, the fact that it proceeds 
from a settlement agreement, the opt-out scheme and the stretching of the 
jurisdictional limits in Dutch practice raise questions as to the recognition and 
enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation.435 The settlement agreement is not 
clear whether the binding declaration qualifies as a “judgment” and the Brussels I 
rules on settlement agreements focus on enforcement rather than on recognition 
 
423. See supra Part III. 
424. See supra Part III.B. 
425. See supra Part III.B. 
426. See supra Part III.C. 
427. See supra Part III.D. 
428. See supra Part III.D. 
429. See supra Part III.D. 
430. See supra Part III.D. 
431. See supra Part III.D. 
432. See supra Part III.D. 
433. See supra Part III.D. 
434. See supra Part IV.  
435. See supra Part IV.A. 
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to secure preclusive effect.436 Additionally, it is conceivable that grounds of 
refusal and notably the public policy exception may be invoked in case an 
individual party that did not opt out wishes to initiate individual litigation.437 
Outside Europe, the opt-out nature, specific procedural features and the wide 
territorial jurisdiction may also create obstacles for recognition and 
enforcement.438 Similar objections have been raised in relation to U.S. class 
actions and settlements.439 As between the Netherlands and the United States, as 
of yet, courts have been willing to recognize or implicitly acknowledge each 
other’s settlements.440 
The issue of the applicable law has not raised much discussion in Dutch 
doctrine and is seldom explicitly addressed in practice.441 As with jurisdiction, the 
focus is on the particularities of the settlement agreement as a contract.442 In all 
but one of the settlements that have been declared binding to date, a choice of 
law clause in favor of Dutch law was included.443 The applicable law to the 
underlying claims may nevertheless be relevant to assess the reasonableness of 
the settlement amount as one of the prerequisites to declare the settlement 
binding.444 It is submitted that the applicable choice of law rules of the Rome I 
and II Regulations, and particularly the liability rules for securities cases, are not 
well adapted since these will result in a multiplication of applicable laws. 
The Commission’s Recommendation marks a step forward in the 
development of collective redress in the European Union.445 Dutch mass 
settlements and upcoming mechanisms in other Member States, including 
England and Wales, and Germany, have put Europe on the map as a venue for 
collective securities litigation with global aspirations.446 However, shortcomings 
and uncertainties in the existing rules on cross-border litigation pose serious 
questions.447 If Europe wants to take the development of collective redress a step 
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